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Nations	 Development	 Programme,	 the	
required	 funding	 for	 the	 project	 has	 been	
raised.	The	Azerbaijan	National	Agency	or	
Mine	 Action	 UXO	 team,	 with	 a	 capacity	
of	 11	 UXO	 operators,	 launched	 the	 proj-
ect	 13	December	 2005.	 ANAMA	 instruc-
tors	 joined	 with	 United	 States	 European	
Command	 (USEUCOM)	 specialists	 to	
train	 an	 additional	 36	UXO	 operators	 for	
the	 same	 project	 at	 ANAMA’s	 Regional	
Office	 in	 Khanlar	 (UXO	 team	 capacity	
within	ANAMA	was	created	with	the	sup-
port	of	USEUCOM	in	2002).
Abandoned ammunition storage clear-
ance. In	 describing	 the	 problem	 of	 ERW,	
the	threat	of	abandoned	ammunition	is	also	
significant.	When	 researching	 information	
on	 the	 subject	 of	 abandoned	 ammunition,	
cases	can	be	found	in	Nigeria,	Albania	and	
Kuwait,	 but	 thus	 far	minimal	 information	
describing	 Azerbaijan’s	 abandoned	 ammu-
nition	problem	is	available.	The	Soviet	ware-
house	in	Agstafa	can	provide	an	additional	
case	 for	better	understanding	 the	 threat	of	
abandoned	ammunition	and	the	challenges	





•	 The	 occurrence	 of	 “ammunition	
spreads”	 in	which	 different	 types	 of	
ammunition	are	mixed	and	scattered	
throughout	the	area	





•	 The	 presence	 of	 white	 phosphorus,	
which	ignites	when	exposed	to	air
•	 Incorrect	 or	 misleading	 marking	
of	UXO	




In	 addition	 to	 planned	 clearance	 proj-
ects	 such	 as	 these	 mentioned,	 ANAMA	
also	provides	rapid	response	to	mine/UXO-	
related	 emergencies.	 When	 one	 Agstafa	
scrap-metal	 workshop	 set	 up	 by	 locals	
exploded	 approximately	 200	 metres	 (219	
yards)	from	a	residential	area,	the	workshop	
itself	 was	 totally	 destroyed	 and,	 according	
to	 official	 information	 by	 local	 authorities,	
three	 people	 were	 killed	 and	 23	 injured.	
Additionally,	the	explosion	damaged	houses	
as	 far	 as	 three	kilometres	 (two	miles)	 from	
the	 workshop.	 Immediately	 following	 the	
explosion,	 ANAMA	 established	 a	 team	 of	
UXO	 operators	 to	 carry	 out	 emergency	
marking	 and	 clearance	 operations	 in	 the	
incident	 area.	 Operations	 lasted	 for	 one	
month	and	as	a	result,	170,000	square	me-
tres	 (42	 acres)	 of	 land	 were	 cleared	 and	
more	 than	 5,007	 items	 of	 UXO	 (among	
them	 1,261	 pieces	 containing	 white	 phos-
phorous)	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 area	
and	 destroyed.	 ANAMA	 has	 continued	
to	 react	 quickly	 to	 any	 mine-	 and	 UXO-	
related	emergencies.
Conclusion
As	 the	 Japanese	 might	 say,	 “Tada yori 
takai mono wa nai” (“We	have	to	pay	much	
more	for	something	we	got	free	of	charge”).	
It	is	important	to	figure	out	how	to	solve	the	
existing	 problem	 of	 UXO	 and	 abandoned	
ammunition	 and	 how	 to	 protect	 ourselves	
from	 ERW	 in	 the	 future.	 Human	 beings	
created	 the	 problem—dropping	 the	 bombs	
and	abandoning	the	ammunition	“for	free”	
on	Azerbaijan—and	now	they	must	correct	
it	 at	 great	 cost	 by	 cleaning	up	 the	 country	
and	making	it	safe	again.





























At	 the	 same	 time,	 small-	 or	 large-calibre	 gun	 ammunition,	 air-
craft	 bombs	 and	mortar	 rounds	 tend	 to	be	more	 stable—although	
when	they	do	explode,	the	results	can	be	much	more	devastating.	
The author discusses the challenges of protecting aid workers riding in 
traditional unarmoured vehicles from the dangers of explosive remnants of 
war. He offers some practical, after-market solutions that provide a high level 
of protection for much less than the cost of traditional armoured vehicles.
Protection of Soft Vehicles 
Against ERW
by	Thomas	Hvidtfeldt	[	Scanfiber	Composites	A/S	]
The	 extent	 to	 which	 AP	mines	 endanger	 passengers	 in	 a	 soft-
skinned	 SUV	 depends	 heavily	 upon	 which	 type	 of	 device	 we’re	
talking	about.	We	can	separate	the	various	devices	into	two	groups	
depending	on	their	primary	kill	mechanism:

















Death Valley Challenge to Raise $100K 
Mines Advisory Group, in partnership with CEIA USA, will sponsor a 423-kilometre (263-mile) 
bike trek across Death Valley, USA. Event organizers hope to raise nearly £40,000 (US$74,000) 
to support mine-action efforts around the globe. 
From 4–11 March 2007, 40 participants will travel and cycle to raise money and awareness. The 
registration fee for the event is only £175 ($325), but each participant is asked to raise 
£2,750 ($5,100) in sponsorships, half of which will cover the cost of running the event. 
Included in trek costs are London-to-Las Vegas airfare, accommodations, nearly all meals, 
the use of bicycles and other sundry expenses.
For more information on this trip, visit www.magclearsmines.org.
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their	 energy	 for	 much	 longer	
and	can	 inflict	 injury	quite	 far	
away	from	the	explosion.	Due	
to	 this	 extended	 range,	 most	







ferent	 ways	 while	 travelling	 in	
an	SUV.	 If	 the	vehicle	detonates	
an	AP	 device	 that	works	 primar-
ily	through	blast,	the	distance	from	
the	 expected	 impact	 point	 (below	
a	 wheel)	 to	 the	 person	 in	 the	 vehicle	
is	normally	high	enough	to	create	a	 safe	
distance.	 However,	 if	 the	 device	 creates	
fragments,	 the	 thin	 steel	 of	 the	 car	 body	
will	 offer	 almost	no	protection	 against	 the	
high-velocity	steel	fragments.	The	standard	
car-body	steel	is	0.8	millimetre	(0.03	inch)	









nition,	 fully	 armoured	 SUVs	 are	 recom-
mended.	However,	apart	 from	being	very	
costly,	 excessively	 heavy	 and	 hard	 to	 ob-
tain	in	sufficient	numbers,	fully	armoured	
SUVs	 tend	 to	 give	 the	wrong	 impression	
of	 the	 humanitarian	 workers—namely	
that	they	are	not	willing	to	take	the	same	











a	 fully	 armoured	 vehicle.	 Consequently,	 a	
much	higher	number	of	vehicles—and	thus	
passengers—can	be	protected	 for	 the	 same	
money.	In	addition,	the	retrofit	solutions	to	








ing	flexible	 armour,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 design	
solutions	that	fit	into	the	curved	interior	and	
floor	of	the	SUV.
In	 terms	 of	 level	 of	 protection,	 flex-
ible	solutions	using	aramide	on	the	interior	
and	floor	 of	 the	 vehicle	 generally	 represent	
a	lower	level	of	protection	than	those	found	
on	 the	 sides	 of	 a	 factory-armoured	 SUV.	
Ballistic	blankets	 are	 available	 from	several	
sources	 and	 are	 a	 system	 of	 tailor-cut	 and	
overlapping	blankets	 that	cover	as	much	of	
the	 interior	of	 the	vehicle	 as	possible	up	 to	
the	windows.3	




panels	 and	 doors	 and	 require	 a	 complete	
stripping	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 After	 reinstalla-
tion,	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 vehicle	 looks	 the	
same	 as	 before,	 with	 no	 visible	 signs	 of	 it	
being	protected.
The	 protection	 level	 of	 the	 blankets	 is	
normally	 specified	 according	 to	 a	 North	
Atlantic	 Treaty	 Organization	 standard	
STANAG	 [Standardisation	 Agreement]	
29202	and	 the	 standard	 level	by	most	non-
governmental	organizations	is	a	level	referred	
to	as	600	m/sec.	It	is	not	possible	to	connect	
this	 level	 directly	 to	 any	 specific	 mine	 or	
grenade	 as	 the	 actual	 conditions	 have	 an	
enormous	 influence	 on	 the	 real	 threat.	
However,	 a	 level	 of	 600	 m/sec	 can	 be	 di-
rectly	 compared	 to	 other	means	 of	 protec-






equipped	with	 ballistic	 blankets	 than	 if	 he	
is	 wearing	 body	 armour;	 in	 addition	 to	 a	
higher	 ballistic	 level,	 the	 ballistic	 blankets	
will	 offer	protection	of	 the	 extremities	 and	
not	only	the	torso.	
Interestingly,	 compared	 to	 a	 fully	 ar-
moured	 SUV,3	 many	 soft-skinned	 vehicles	
equipped	 with	 ballistic	 blankets	 are	 better	




according	 to	 an	 old	 German	 standard	 for	
armoured	 limousines	 known	 as	 the	 “two	
hand	 grenades”	 level.	 Unfortunately,	 the	






New	 technologies	 with	 in-the-field	 ar-
mouring	options	can	be	fitted	and	removed	
when	 there	 is	 no	 immediate	 danger.	 This	
type	of	protection	is	designed	to	provide	an	
increased	 level	of	protection	against	ERW	
and	 other	 weapons	 that	 explode	 next	 to	




and	 implemented	 in	 the	 future	 will	 con-
tinue	 to	 better	 the	 working	 conditions	 of	
personnel	exposed	to	such	risks.














W orldwide,	 landmines	 and	 unexploded	ordnance	 kill	 and	 maim	 approximately	20,000	 people	 annually,	 one	 third	 of	
them	children.3	
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 international	 community	 has	
not	paid	serious	attention	to	the	risk	posed	by	the	UXO	











Nowadays	 the	 international	 community	 is	 paying	













Explosive Remnants of War and 
Their Consequences
by	Jonmahmad	Rajabov	[	Tajikistan	Mine	Action	Centre	]
This article examines the post-conflict situation of Tajikistan, which has not only anti-personnel 
mines but various kinds of explosive remnants of war. Recently Tajikistan signed Protocol V1 
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,2 
which includes a commitment to clear the nation’s ERW. 
The author highlights some of the different sources of 
ERW in Tajikistan as well as the progress being made by 
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